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Karin Zwaan∗ 
1. Introduction 
The Aznar Protocol No. 24 is a protocol to the Treaty of the European Union (it 
became part of the EU treaties in 1999). The Aznar Protocol was an initiative of Spain. 
Spain was dissatisfied with the way Belgium and France dealt with asylum request from 
and offered protection to Spanish citizens who had committed or were suspected to 
have committed terrorist activities for the ETA.1 At first, Spain proposed to exclude 
EU-citizens from the right to seek asylum within the EU as follows: ‘Every citizen of 
the Union shall be regarded, for all legal and judicial purposes connected with the gran-
ting of refugee status and matters relating to asylum, as a national of the Member State 
in which he is seeking asylum. Consequently, no State of the Union shall agree to pro-
cess an application for asylum submitted by a national of another State of the Union.’2 
The text that finally was adopted is ‘less’ far reaching.  
The Aznar Protocol contains one single Article stating in short that Member States 
do not grant asylum to citizens of another Member State.3 The reason for this is, ac-
cording to the text of the Protocol, the level of protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms by the Member States of the European Union. This level is such that: ‘Mem-
ber States shall be regarded as constituting safe countries of origin in respect of each 
other for all legal and practical purposes in relation to asylum matters. Accordingly, any 
application for asylum made by a national of a Member State may not be taken into 
consideration or declared admissible for processing by another Member State’. Belgium 
is the only EU country that has made a separate declaration, emphasizing the conditi-
oning of the application of the Protocol.4 Subsequently, specifically enumerated excep-
tions are listed. An asylum application by an EU-citizen may be taken into considera-
tion or declared admissible by another Member State only in the following cases:  
 
‘(a) if the Member State of which the applicant is a national proceeds after the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam, availing itself of the provisions of Article 15 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to take measures 
derogating in its territory from its obligations under that Convention;  
                                                        
∗  Researcher, Centre for Migration Law, Radboud University Nijmegen 
1  ETA is an acronym of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ‘Basque Homeland and Freedom’, an armed Basque 
nationalist and separatist organisation. 
2  Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Discussion Paper, 
Brussels, 4 February 1997. SN/507/97 (C 8), para. 1. 
3  This contribution is partly based on an unpublished paper: A. Terlouw, C. Grütters and K. Zwaan, 
Implementation of the Aznar Protocol, March 2014. 
4  OJ C340, 10.11.1997, p. 1-144; ‘Declarations the conference took note of’, Declaration 5 to Protocol 
24. 
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(b) if the procedure referred to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union has been initiated 
and until the Council, or, where appropriate, the European Council, takes a decision in respect 
thereof with regard to the Member State of which the applicant is a national;  
(c)  if the Council has adopted a decision in accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on 
European Union in respect of the Member State of which the applicant is a national or if the 
European Council has adopted a decision in accordance with Article 7(2) of that Treaty in 
respect of the Member State of which the applicant is a national;  
(d)  if a Member State should so decide unilaterally in respect of the application of a national 
of another Member State; in that case the Council shall be immediately informed; the 
application shall be dealt with on the basis of the presumption that it is manifestly unfounded 
without affecting in any way, whatever the cases may be, the decision-making power of the 
Member State.’  
 
What does this imply for an asylum seeker having well-founded fear for persecution 
coming from an EU Member State? In principle his country of origin will be considered 
to be a safe country, able and willing to protect, meaning that the asylum claim will be 
rejected. There are a few exceptions. Only if the country of origin of the asylum seeker 
has formally derogated from its human rights obligations, or if that has been determi-
ned through a political process that this Member State is a serious and persistent vio-
lator of human rights, an asylum application can be dealt with by another EU Member 
State. In any other circumstances, an asylum request can only be received if there is a 
unilateral Member States decision, which is communicated to a political organ of the 
EU, the Council.5 The preamble justifies the protocol on the following grounds: The 
TEU recognizes rights, freedoms and principles as set out in the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights and as guaranteed by the ECHR; The Court of Justice of the EU has 
the power to ensure fundamental rights are respected within the scope of EU law; The 
TEU provides that membership of the EU is only open to states which comply with 
European fundamental rights and a mechanism for sanction exists against states which 
fail to live up to their commitments; EU citizens are entitled to a special status and 
have the right to move and reside freely across the territory of the Member States in 
an area without internal frontiers; and finally The institution of asylum should not be 
used for purposes alien to those for which it was intended.  
In this contribution the consequences of the Aznar protocol will be analysed, and 
special attention will be given to the ‘protection’ gap that exists due to this Protocol 
                                                        
5  Compare K. Landgren, Deflecting international protection by treaty: bilateral and multilateral accords 
on extradition, readmission and the inadmissibility of asylum requests, New Issues in Refugee Re-
search, Working paper No. 10, June 1999, p. 9. 
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for specific categories of EU-citizens.6 Also Elspeth Guild in her work has given much 
attention to this ‘Geography of Refugee Protection’.7 
2. Mutual Trust? 
The Aznar Protocol is based on the idea of mutual trust between EU Member States. 
The principle of mutual trust is based on Article 2 TEU: ‘The Union is founded on the 
values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law 
and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men pre-
vail’. The presumption of the Aznar protocol is that EU-citizens come from safe 
countries of origin.8 There is no general sovereignty clause in the Protocol and the 
exceptions to the mutual trust of the Aznar system are rather restrictive and require 
from a Member State that wants to examine an application of an EU-citizen on the 
substance at least to inform the Commission but preferable to consult other Member 
States. This restriction of the sovereignty can be understood by the character of a de-
cision to grant a refugee states to an asylum seeker fleeing from another EU Member 
State. Although granting asylum officially always has been seen as a matter to be viewed 
separately from criticism of the country of origin, and as a peaceful and humanitarian 
act9, protection against persecution by other states, is based upon distrust or disap-
proval of other states or on a judgment that this other State has abused its authority. 
Granting asylum to an EU-citizen therefore is an implicit statement that this Member 
State is persecuting its citizens or failing to offer protection. 
                                                        
6  In this contribution the question whether the right of free movement is an alternative for refugee 
protection will not be dealt with. See on this C.A. Groenendijk, Kunnen Unieburgers nog vluchten? 
Bescherming van Roma door het Vluchtelingenverdrag en het vrij verkeer in de EU, in A. Terlouw en 
K. Zwaan (red.), Tijd en Asiel. 60 jaar vluchtelingenverdrag, Oisterwijk: WLP 2011, pp. 59-81; P.R. 
Rodrigues, ‘Vrij verkeer van Roma in Frankrijk’ in K. Groenendijk (red.) Issues that matter, Mensen-
rechten, minderheden en migranten. Oisterwijk: WLP 2013, pp. 87-97; D. Mahoney, ‘Expulsion of 
the Roma; is France Violating EU Freedom of Movement and Playing by French Rules or can it 
proceed with collective Roma Expulsions Free of Charge’, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 37, 
2, 2012, pp. 649-682. 
7  E. Guild, Examining the European Geography of Refugee Protection. Exclusions, Limitations and 
Exceptions from the 1967 Protocol to the Present, Nijmegen Migration Law Working Paper Series 
2012/03; E. Guild and K.M. Zwaan, Does Europe still create Refugees? Examining the Situation of 
Roma, Queens Law Journal, vol. 40, iss. 1, (2015), pp. 142-164; E. Guild, Does the EU need a European 
Migration and Protection Agency? International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 28, iss. 4 (2016), pp. 585-600; 
S. Carrera and E. Guild, EU Borders and Their Controls. Preventing Unwanted Movement of People 
in Europe?, CEPS 2013. 
8  G. Noll, Negotiating Asylum: The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common Market 
of Deflection, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 2000. 
9  Declaration on Territorial Asylum, GA res. 2312 (XXII), 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 81, U.N. 
Doc. A/6716 (1967) and B.P. Vermeulen et al., Persecution by Third Parties, Commissioned by the Re-
search and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands, Nijmegen: Centre 
for Migration Law, May 1998. 
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The landmark cases M.S.S. by the ECtHR10 and N.S. by the CJEU11 have shown 
that non-rebuttable trust is not allowed when this would jeopardise the protection of 
the fundamental rights of the individual.12 Moreover, the mutual trust principle is set-
aside in cases of unaccompanied minors.13 Relevant for the mutual trust which forms 
the basis of the Aznar protocol is that these Court decisions make clear that an escape 
to blind trust is necessary even if it concerns trust between EU-countries. The CJEU 
has not reviewed a case regarding asylum seekers, who are EU nationals yet.. So far, 
the closest-related case to the problematics of the Aznar Protocol in the jurisprudence 
of CJEU is the N.S. and M.E. case, concerning the possibility of rebuttal of mutual 
trust in cases of risk of ill-treatment of asylum seekers under the Dublin system.14 But 
the absoluteness of mutual trust was confirmed in Opinion 2/13 of the CJEU which 
emphasized the fundamental importance of mutual trust.15 
It can be concluded that there is at least a tension between the Aznar Protocol, and 
international obligations that are incorporated in the Refugee Convention, the Con-
vention Against Torture, and the ECHR.16 It can have as a consequence that asylum 
requests are not dealt with, that refugees are not recognised as such, and that asylum 
seekers are returned to a country where they have to fear for persecution (in this case 
an EU Member State). In this regard it is interesting to refer to the Kadi case, in which 
                                                        
10  ECtHR, 21 January 2011, appl. no. 30696/09, para. 345: ‘The Court must therefore now consider 
whether the Belgian authorities should have regarded as rebutted the presumption that the Greek 
authorities would respect their international obligations in asylum matters, in spite of the K.R.S. case-
law, which the Government claimed the administrative and judicial authorities had wanted to follow 
in the instant case.’, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, m.nt. Spijkerboer A&MR 2011, nr. 1 p. 32/33 and 
m.nt Battjes A&MR 2011, 2, p. 66-74. 
11  CJEU 21 December 2011, NS v SSHD, C-411/10, para. 83: ‘At issue here is the raison d’être of the 
European Union and the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice and, in particular, the 
Common European Asylum System, based on mutual confidence and a presumption of compliance, 
by other Member States, with European Union law and, in particular, fundamental rights.' CJEU 21 
December 2011, N.S., C-493/10, and M.E et al. C-411/10. 
12  C. Costello, ‘Dublin-case NS/ME: Finally, an end to blind trust across the EU?’, A&MR, 2012 no. 2, 
p. 83-92; V. Moreno-Lax, ‘Dismantling the Dublin System: M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece’, European 
Journal of Migration and Law, 2012, 14, p. 1-31; P. Brown, P. Dwyer, & L. Scullion, The Limits of Inclu-
sion? Exploring the views of Roma and Non-Roma in six European Union Member States, Manches-
ter: University of Salford 2013. 
13  CJEU 6 June 2013, C-648/11, MA and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, England and 
Wales. 
14  Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 estab-
lishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national 
or a stateless person, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 31–59. 
15  Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014, Accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Case Opin-
ion 2/13. 
16  A. Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2009; V. Moreno Lax, ‘Must EU Borders Have Doors for Refugees? On the Compatibility of 
Schengen Visas and Carrier Sanctions with EU Member States’ Obligations to Provide International 
Protection to Refugees’, European Journal of Migration and Law 2008, pp. 315-364.  
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the CJEU judged that the protection of fundamental rights forms part of the very foun-
dations of the Union legal order.17 Accordingly, all Union measures must be compati-
ble with fundamental rights.  
While Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention provides that ‘No Contracting 
Party shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social ground or political opinion’, the 
Aznar Protocol permits a Member State to limit its obligations to a refugee where 
his/her state of origin is a Member State of the EU. The principle set out in the Aznar 
Protocol of the exclusion of nationals of the Member States from international protec-
tion in another Member State has been reflected in the other instruments forming part 
of the secondary legislation of the EU on asylum, the personal scope of which is limited 
to third country nationals – that is persons who are not nationals of the Member Sta-
tes.18 
The fundamental role of the mutual trust principle has an impact on both extradi-
tion law and asylum law, as well as on the intersection between asylum and extradition 
in political offence cases like that of Puigdemont.19 Carles Puigdemont is a Catalan 
pro-independence politician and journalist from Spain, currently living in Belgium. On 
6–7 September 2017, he approved laws for permitting an independence referendum, 
and the juridical transition and foundation of a Republic, a new constitution for Cata-
lonia that would be in place if the referendum supported independence. On 30 October 
2017 charges of rebellion, sedition and misuse of public funds were brought against 
Puigdemont and other members of the Puigdemont Government. Puigdemont, along 
with others, fled to Belgium. However, the application of mutual trust to asylum and 
extradition does not have an extensive theoretical basis. Just the contrary: The reason 
for the introduction of mutual trust to asylum and extradition of political offenders in 
the EU legislation can be narrowed down to one single case, as also the case of Puig-
demont shows.   
International protection may be needed for EU nationals in another Member State. 
Seeking and being granted asylum on the grounds of political opinion or cumulative 
discrimination is very unlikely in the EU, but, as the Puigdemont and Roma cases20 
(see next paragraph 3) indicate – not an impossibility. Puigdemont has become the face 
of a very uneasy problem the EU is confronted with upholding mutual trust for the 
sake of long-term cooperation, while facing an asylum claim.  
While Carles Puigdemont, whose potential asylum application has not been filed, 
is the sole EU national with a public face and a specified name, to illustrate the norm-
                                                        
17  CJEU 3 September 2008, C–402/05P and C–415/05P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council and Commission, ECR I–6351. 
18  See e.g. the Qualification Directive, Directive 2011/95/EU on standards for the qualification of third-
country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status 
for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection 
granted (recast), OJ L 337/9-26, Art. 1. 
19  See Dace Winther, Extradition, Asylum and Mutual Trust in the European Union One man’s terrorist 
is another man’s freedom fighter, yet another man’s asylum seeker, yet another man’s fugitive, Master 
Thesis Spring 2018. 
20  See e.g. the fact sheet of the ECtHR on Roma and Travellers, april 2019, https://www.echr.coe.int/ 
Documents/FS_Roma_ENG.pdf 
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conflict in the Aznar Protocol, he is far from being the only individual whose rights are 
concerned.21 
3. Asylum Applications of EU-citizens in EU Member States and non-EU 
Member States 
First some data on asylum applications by citizens of EU Member States in other Mem-
ber States will be presented (Table 1). The ratio behind this is the hypothesis that pro-
bably the main social group or minority in Europe that may have in certain regions a 
well-founded fear of persecution, are Roma. If that is a correct assumption, the majo-
rity of asylum applications that are made by EU citizens in an EU Member State could 
be Roma.22 
The available data over the period 2000-2018 show that most EU Member States 
do not ‘produce’ asylum seekers, or if they do, the relevant numbers are very small, e.g. 
less than five. These asylum requests therefore can be labelled as incidental. There are, 
however, a few Member States that have ‘produced’ on a more ‘regular’ basis larger 
numbers of asylum seekers who have applied for asylum in one of the EU Member 
States. In the following the focus is on the asylum applications from citizens of these 
states. These states are: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. 
As is listed in Table 1, the estimated total population of Roma in these 5 Southeast- 
and Central European (SEE) countries is 3 million, which is roughly one fourth of the 
total population of Roma in Europe.23 
All of these countries have become a Member State of the EU in the last decade. 
The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia joined the EU in 2004, whereas Bulgaria 
and Romania became a Member State in 2007. This implies that the data that will be 
provided in the following graphs reflect asylum applications, partly by citizens from 
non-EU states, and partly by citizens from EU Member States, depending on the refe-
rence point in time. However, this may also illustrate the possible quantitative effect of 
becoming a Member State of the EU on the number of asylum applications submitted 
by citizens of these new Member States in other Member States.24 
 
                                                        
21  https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-european-arrest-warrant-against-puigdemont-a-feeling-of-deja-vu/ 
22  See also E. Guild and K.M. Zwaan, Does Europe still create Refugees? Examining the Situation of 
Roma , Queens Law Journal, vol. 40, iss. 1, (2015), pp. 142-164. 
23  H. O’Nions, ‘Roma Expulsions and Discriminations: The Elephant in Brussels’, European Journal of 
Migration and Law, 13:4,2011, pp. 361-388. 
24  ERRC fact sheet, Mob Justice: Collective Punishment against Roma in Europe, https://issuu.com/ro-
marightsjournal/docs/mob-justice-collective-punishment-a. 
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Table 1.25 Total # first instance decisions on asylum applications in EU 28 of citizens from Bulgaria, 
Czechia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia 
 
 
Although the Aznar Protocol is not implemented in the national legislation in every 
Member State, applications from EU-citizens are in one way or another rejected and 
in some EU Member States not even processed or registered.26  
If the assumption is correct that the Aznar Protocol does prevent EU citizens, 
such as Roma, from applying for asylum in one of the EU Member States, it might be 
relevant to look at other countries of asylum outside the EU. The first option is in 
Europe. Nearby and not bound to EU regulations: Switzerland and Norway. From 
Table 2 it shows, that even though it is only in very rare cases that asylum is actually 
granted to an EU national in another EU Member State, asylum claims have indeed 
been filed by EU nationals both inside and outside the EU. In the past decade asylum 
outside the European Union has been granted to nationals from nearly every EU Mem-
ber State. Incomparably more positive decisions on granting asylum have been made 
outside the EU, comparing to inside of the EU.27  
 
                                                        
25  Tables 1 and 2 made by mr.dr.C. Grütters on the basis of Eurostat data.  
26  See also Report on the evaluation of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up 
to 2020, COM (2018) 785 final. 
27  R. Allveri, EU Accession to the ECHR and the Stumbling block of Asylum Protocol 24, Ankara Law 
Review 2012, pp. 175-194. 
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Table 2. Total # first instance decisions on asylum applications in Norway and Switzerland of citizens 
from Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary Romania, Slovakia 
 
 
In most countries it is possible to rebut the presumption of safety of EU Member 
States that no well-founded fear exists, but the burden of proof is heavy or the time 
pressure of the accelerated procedure is high. In the details there are important diffe-
rences between the different EU countries. The asylum seeker for example may have 
difficulties in rebutting the presumption if no interview on the merits takes place. Also 
if his appeal has no suspensive effect, or if he cannot benefit from reception measures, 
he may encounter problems to rebut the presumption of safety.  
A far more interesting picture comes up if the asylum applications of EU-citizens 
in Canada are analysed. The recognition rates of Canada prove that EU-citizens can be 
refugees and as such can fall under the scope of the Refugee Convention28, Article 3 
ECHR, Article 3 Convention Against Torture and Article 18 EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights. Rules with regard to the qualification as refugees and on asylum proce-
dures must pursuant to Article 78(1) TFEU first clause be in accordance with the Re-
fugee Convention and relevant international law. Moreover, Article 52(3) of the Char-
ter provides that, in so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR, ‘the meaning and the scope of those rights shall be the same 
as those laid down by the said Convention.’ The meaning and the scope of the guaran-
teed rights are determined not only by the text of the ECHR, but also by case law of 
the ECtHR and by the Court of Justice of the EU.29 The explanations state that ‘in any 
                                                        
28  J. Tóth, ‘Czech and Hungarian Roma Exodus to Canada: how to distinguish between Unbearable 
Destitution and Unbearable Persecution’, in: D. Bigo, S. Carrera and E. Guild,, Foreigners, refugees or 
minorities?: rethinking people in the context of border controls and visas, Ashgate: Farnham 2013, pp. 39-54. 
29  A.M. Reneman, EU asylum procedures and the right to an effective remedy (diss. Leiden), Leiden: Uitgeverij 
BOXPress 2012, p. 54. 
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event, the level of protection afforded by the Charter may never be lower than that 
guaranteed by the ECHR.’30  
The circumstances in asylum cases must always be judged on an individual basis. 
Therefore the provisions of the Aznar Protocol create an exceptionally high threshold 
for an asylum claim by an EU national in another EU Member State.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
Landgren takes a strong view:  
 
‘The purpose of the Protocol is radically to reduce, or to remove, asylum possibilities within the 
EU for Union-citizens. It violates the letter and the spirit of the 1951 Refugee Convention, as 
well as other human rights instruments and principles in five broad areas. It makes asylum 
decisions subject to a political process, which includes the alleged violator state; it does not (as a 
general principle) examine the individual grounds for fear of persecution; it restricts access to 
any form of status determination procedures; it discriminates on the basis of nationality, and it 
evades international obligations through reliance on the obligations of another state.’31  
 
This contribution argues that there are at least tensions between the Aznar Protocol 
and international obligations laid down in the Refugee Convention, the Convention 
Against Torture, the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Aznar 
Protocol and the exclusion of EU-asylum seekers from the EU asylum acquis can have 
as a consequence that asylum requests are not dealt with, that refugees are not recog-
nised as such and that they are returned to a country where they have a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted. In this regard this situation is comparable to the one in the 
Kadi case, in which the CJEU judged that the protection of fundamental rights forms 
part of the very foundations of the Union legal order.32 Accordingly, all Union measu-
res must be compatible with fundamental rights.  
Apparently, there is a protection gap for EU-citizens who have a well-founded fear 
of persecution. In most EU countries they cannot apply for asylum or their applications 
are rejected in accelerated procedures. A possibility to rebut the presumption of safety 
of their country of origin is not always foreseen or realistic. All Member States are 
presumed to respect freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights, based on 
the principle of mutual trust. That is why it is particularly complicated to grant asylum 
to a refugee from another Member State. The fact that asylum claims by EU nationals 
– from EU-Roma and from those comparable to Puigdemont- would have to be 
treated as ‘manifestly unfounded’, shows that the threshold set in the Aznar Protocol 
is very high. Mutual trust prevails. 
 
                                                        
30  Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02), OJ 14 December 2007, 
C 303/33. 
31  K. Landgren, Deflecting international protection by treaty: bilateral and multilateral accords on extra-
dition, readmission and the inadmissibility of asylum requests, New Issues in Refugee Research, Work-
ing paper No. 10, June 1999, p. 13. 
32  CJEU 3 September 2008, C–402/05P and C–415/05P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council and Commission. 
